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CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR REGISTRATION OF
UNAUTHORIZED FIDUCIARY TRANSFERS OF STOCK
A DILIGENT fiduciary holding corporate securities in ,trust customarily
secures their registration on the corporate books in a manner disclosing the
fiduciary nature of their ownership.' Should the fiduciary transfer the se-
curities in breach of his trust, and then register the transfer on the books
of the corporation, the corporation will be liable to the injured cestui under
the common law rule.2 Statutory enactments in some twenty jurisdictions
have drastically limited this liability.3 The resultant complexity has been
further increased by considerable variation among the degrees of exemption
granted to the corporation by these statutes-ranging from a release of cor-
porate liability on production of an order of court authorizing transfer,4 to
the extended exemption in the recently enacted New York statute.5 Further-
more, where -the transactions have taken place in more than one state, the
composite nature of the act of registration" and uncertainty as to which
phase, if any, is responsible for corporate liability, surround the choice of
controlling law with many difficulties. This Comment will trace the develop-
ment of the differing rules of liability and will consider the various argu-
mentative devices available in a conflict of laws situation.
At common law, registration in the name of a fiduciary was sufficient
notice to impress upon the corporation not only complete responsibility for
the legal authority of the fiduciary,7 but also the duty of reasonable inquiry
1. This procedure permits a desirable segregation of the trust re.q. See Cunus'rv,
THE TRANSFER OF STOCK (1929) § 72; 12 FLETCHER, CORFORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1932)
§ 5518.
2. See notes 8 and 9, infra.
3. The majority of these statutes are enactments of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.
For a listing of the states adopting the provisions of this Act dealing with stock tranis-
fers, see 9 U. L. A. (Supp. 1937) 79. Modifications of corporate liability are also con-
tained in the following statutes: CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1937) §§ 328(b) (d) ; DEL.
Rnv. CODE (1935) c. 98, § 61; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, 1936) § 4707; LA. GrNi. SAr.
ANx. (Dart, 1932) §§ 1206-1208; 'D. CODE PuB. LOCAL LAWS (Flack, Supp. 1935)
art. 23, § 73Y2; MAss. ANN. LAWS (1933) c. 203, § 21; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page,
1938) §§ 8623-33, 33a.
4. DEL. REv. CODE (1935) c. 98, § 61.
5. N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW (Supp. 1938) art. 23-B, §§ 359-i-to-k (added by L. 1937,
c. 344).
6. Registration consists of the cancellation of the old stock certificate on its sur-
render, the recordation of a transfer of the shares on the stock book, and the issuatpce
of a new certificate. See N. Y. LAW REVIsION CO2tMISSION, LEGis. Doe., No. (5 (I)
p. 14 (1937).
7. Telegraph Company v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369 (1878) (forgery); St. Romes
v. Levee Steam Cotton Press Co., 127 U. S. 614 (1887) (limited power of attorney) ;
Fiala v. Conn. Elec. Serv. Co., 114 Conn. 172, 158 At. 211 (1932) ; Escat v. Leaman,
181 So. 621 (La. 1938) (invalid indorsements) ; Casto v. Wrenn, 255 Mass. 72, 150 N. R.
898 (1926) (mere custodian); Egan v. Smith, 325 Pa. 163, 189 Atl. 488 (1937) (for-
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as to his power under the terms of the trust to make the particular transfer
for which registration was requested.8 A similar result obtained when notice
of a trust in the security was imputed to the corporation through the form
of indorsement or assignment.9 If the transfer were actually a breach of
trust discoverable on such inquiry, failure to exert this measure of care
rendered the corporation liable to the holder of the equitable interests so
disclosed.' 0 The basis of the corporation's duty in this respect is generally
attributed to judge Taney's language in Lowry v. Conznercial and Farmers'
Bank," suggesting that the corporation is the custodian of the shares of its
stock, with a trustee's duty to protect all individual interests in those shares.
The corporation could protect itself, of course, by delaying registration of
the transfer until reasonable inquiry disclosed no indication of a breach of
trust by the fiduciary.'- But when delay exceeded a reasonable period, or
-was based on unreasonable restrictions on transfer, a lawful transferee of
the certificate could compel a transfer on the corporate booksla or claim
damages for a conversion of the shares through such refusal.' 4
gery). Contra: Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Bauer-Pogue & Co., 194 Ark. 10 2,
110 S. AV. (2d) 529 (1937) (forgery).
8. Lowry v. Commercial and Farmers' Bank, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,531 (C. C. Md.
1848); Geyser-Marion Gold-'Mining Co. v. Stark, 106 Fed. 5558 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901);
farbury, Trustee v. Ehlen, 72 Md. 206, 19 At. 648 (1890) ; Bohlen's Estate, 75 Pa. 304
(1874); Caulkins v. Gas-Light Co., 85 Tenn. 683, 4 S. NV. 237 (1887); West v. Tintic
Standard Mining Co., 71 Utah 158, 263 Pac. 490 (1928); cf. Cooper v. Illinois Cent.
R. R., 38 App. Div. 22, 57 N. Y. Supp. 925 (1st Dep't 1899) (registered bonds). Cali-
fornia and 'Maryland courts have termed limited registration without further definition
of trust or cestui as mere descriptio personae, not amounting to constructive notice.
Young v. New Pedrara Onyx Co., 48 Cal. App. 1, 192 Pac. 55 (1920); Grafilin V. Robb,
84 Afd. 451, 35 At. 971 (1896). See 12 FLrrcnER, CoaroiONA.s (Penn. ed. 1932)
§ 5547.
9. Transfers without legal authority: Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Waymnan
and Stockett, 5 Gill 336 (11d. 1847); Clarkson Home v. 'Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 182
N. Y. 47, 74 N. E. 571 (1905) (registered bonds). Transfers in breach of trust: Aran-
son v. Bank of America, etc., Ass'n, 9 Cal. (2d) 640, 72 P. (2d) 548 (1937), aff'g, 65 P.
(2d) 823 (Cal. App. 1937); Chew & Goldsborough v. The Bank of Baltimore, 14 Md.
299 (1859); Baker v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 173 N. C. 365, 92 S. E. 170 (1917);
Peck v. The Bank of America, 16 R. I. 710, 19 At. 369 (1890).
10. See notes 8 and 9, supra.
11. 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,581, at 1047 (C. C. Md. 1848).
12. And this power authorizes a demand for instruments validating transfer. Tyson
-v George's Creek C. & I. Co., 115 Md. 564, 81 At. 41 (1911); Spellissy v. Coo!: &
Bernheimer Co., 58 App. Div. 283, 68 N. Y. Supp. 995 (1st Dep't 1901); Bayard v.
Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, 52 Pa. 232 (1866).
13. Skinner v. Ft. Wayne, T. H. & S. W. R. R., 58 Fed. 55 (C. C. D. Ind. 1893);
O'Neil v. Wolcott 'Mining Co., 174 Fed. 527 (C. C. . 8th, 1909); Morris v. Hussong
Dyeing Mach. Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 256, 86 At. 1026 (1913) ; Rice -. Rockefeller, 134 X. Y.
174, 31 N. E. 907 (1892). In England, a corporation, if acting in good faith, has abso-
lute discretion in executing transfers. In re Crossman, 104 L. J. K. B. (x.s.) 124 (Ct.
Appeal 1935); see Company Law and Practice (1935), 79 So- J. 99, 602. See gener-
ally, 12 FiErcaER, CoapoPa~oxs (Penn. ed. 1932) § 5519.
14. Hilton v. Sylvania & Girard R. R., 8 Ga. App. 10, 68 S. E. 746 (1910) ; Dooley
-v. 'Mines & Milling Co., 134 Iowa 468, 109 N. \V. 864 (1906). Contra: Robertsun v.
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These consequences were attached to the act of registration at a time when
legal title to the shares could be passed only with the corporation's active
cooperation by means of recordation. 1  Because .the certificate was regarded
merely as evidence of share ownership,"; even a bona fide transferee for
value of the certificate acquired only equitable title to the shares,1  with the
right to demand legal title by a transfer on the books.' 8 Although shares
became assignable as choses in action at an early date,'9 the concurrence of
the corporate obligor was considered necessary to effect the novation under-
lying the transaction. 20 The act of registration thus attained significance as
the proximate cause of the beneficial owner's inability to follow the trust
property.21
Commercial development of the share as a method of corporate financing
and the vast expansion of trading in stock certificates on security exchanges
led to the embodiment in the certificate of many of the legal incidents for-
merly associated with the share.22 Registration ceased to be mandatory for a
Nicholes Co., Inc., 141 Misc. 660, 253 N. Y. Supp. 76 (Mun. Ct. N. Y. 1931) (justi-
fying change in previous New York rule by increased corporate activity). Of course,
an election must be made between these alternate remedies. Va. Public Service Co. v.
Steindler, 166 Va. 686, 187 S. E. 353 (1936), (1936) 25 GEO. L. J. 182; see C1lISTY,
THE TRANSFER OF STOCK (1929) § 258; Comments (1934) 82 U. oF PA. L. R,,. 523,
(1928) 54 A. L. R. 1157. There is substantial conflict as to whether a third remedy of
mandamus lies against a corporate official to compel a transfer of stock. See 12 FLtIII-
ER, CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1932) § 5521.
15. This assumes the usual statutory or charter provision requiring registration
of transfer on the corporate books. Ottumwa Screen Co. v. Stodghill, 103 Iowa 437,
72 N. W. 669 (1897); Walker Caldwell Producing Co. v. Menefee, 240 S. W, 1023 (Tex,
1922). Where there is no such provision, any conveyance sufficient in law to transfer
absolute title to personal property vests full rights in the assignee. Sylvania & Girard
R. R. v. Hoge, 129 Ga. 734, 59 S. E. 806 (1907). See Comment (1937) 25 GEO. L. J.
729.
16. The primary evidence of share ownership at this time would be the stock books.
Pacific National Bank v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 227 (1891); Bank of Commerce's Appeal, 73
Pa. 59 (1873).
17. The usual contest involved an unregistered transferee and a subsequent attach-
ing creditor of the transferor. National Bank v. Watsontown Bank, 105 U. S. 217
(1881) ; De Nunzio v. De Nunzio, 90 Conn. 342, 97 At. 323 (1916) ; Reilly v. Abecon
Land Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 71, 71 Atl. 248 (1908). See STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936)
§ 129.
18. McLean v. Medicine Co., 96 Mich. 479, 56 N. -V. 68 (1893) ; Brisbane v. Dela-
ware, L. & W. R. R., 94 N. Y. 204 (1883).
19. Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (1930);
Commercial Bank of Buffalo v. Kortright, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 348 (1809); Poole v.
Middleton, 29 Beav. 646 (Rolls Ct. 1861).
20. See note 16, supra. Russell v. Easterbrook, 71 Conn. 50, 40 At. 905 (1898);
Johnson v. Underhill, 52 N. Y. 203 (1873).
21. See note 8, supra. One case regarded the corporation's act of registration as
taking title for a moment to the shares, and thus becoming liable as a purchaser with
notice of equitable interests. Cooper v. Spring Valley Water Co., 171 Cal. 158, 162,
153 Pac. 936, 939 (1915).
22. The certificate now approaches complete negotiability. National Safe Deposit
Co. v. Hibbs, 229 U. S. 391 (1913); Russell v. American Bell Telephone Co., 180 Mass.
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valid transfer between the parties,2 as provisions stating that stock was
transferable only on the corporate books were interpreted to be solely for
the protection of the corporation in treating the record holder as entitled to
voting rights24 and dividend payments, 25 and as liable for calls and assess-
ments on the shares .2  This shift in emphasis towards negotiability of the
certificate culminated in -the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.27 Under the
terms of this Act, valid indorsement and effective delivery of the certificate
pass legal title to the shares, free of undisclosed equities, to a purchaser for
value without notice.28 The inference must not be drawn, however, that
the reduction of registration to a ministerial function, except for matters of
internal management, has the effect of eliminating corporate liability for
improper registration of a transfer by a fiduciary in breach of his trust, on
the ground that registration no longer constitutes the proximate cause of
injury to the holder of equitable interests disclosed by the certificate.2 0 The
Act is designed primarily to define the rights of parties and their privies to
a transfer of the certificates, and not to vary the liability of the corporation
467, 62 N. E. 751 (1902); Union Trust Co. v. Oliver, 214 N. Y. 517, 103 N. E. 809
(1915) ; Shattuck v. American Cement Co., 205 Pa. 197, 54 Ad. 785 (1903). See gener-
ally CHRIsTY, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK (1929) § 12; 12 FLETCHER, ConroRArT:Os
(Perm. ed. 1932) § 5477; Comment (1924) 2 N. C. L. REv. 118.
23. Chadwick v. Parkhill Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 105, 141 Atl. 823 (1928); Hogg v.
Eckhardt, 343 Ill. 246, 175 N. E. 38 (1931). This view secured earlier recognition by
courts of Massachusetts [Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co., 25 Mass. 90 (1828)], New York
[Bank of Utica v. Smalley, 2 Cow. 770 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1824)], and Pennsylvania
[United States v. Vaughan, 3 Binn. 394 (Pa. 1811)]. See BALL1;,ixE, Conrovrio.
LAW AND Pacricc (1930) § 147; CnRisT, THE TRANsFER or STOCK (1929) §§ 30-32;
12 FLETCHER, CoRoRAToNs (Perm. ed. 1932) § 5489.
24. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20 (1887); Matter of Ringler & Co., 204 N. Y.
30, 97 N. E. 593 (1912). Contra: In re Canal Construction Co., 182 Ad. 345 (Ct. Ch.
Del. 1936), (1936) 34 M6ficH. L. Rmy. 1039. See 12 FLETCHER, CORATIoNs (Perm.
ed. 1932) § 5501.
25. Brisbane v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 94 N. Y. 204 (1883) ; Bank v. Schlichter,
191 '. C. 352, 131 S. E. 732 (1926). The corporation is sometimes required to discover
the holder of the certificate in the event of a dividend in liquidation. Bath Savings Inst.
v. Sagadahoc Nat. Bank, 89 Me. 500, 36 Atl. 996 (1897). See FT-rcuER, Conxrto. ,s
(Perm. ed. 1932) § 5504.
26. Shellington v. Howland, 53 N. Y. 371 (1873); see Johnston v. Laflin, 103 U. S.
800 (1880) ; FLETCHER, CoaRoRATo.Ns (Perm. ed. 1932) § 5503.
27. 6 U. L. A. §§ 1-26. But apparently full negotiability has not always been
achieved. It has been indicated that a true owner will not be deprived of title by theft
or loss of a stock certificate, even when indorsed in blank. See National Surety Co. v.
Indemnity Ins. Co., 237 App. Div. 485, 489, 261 N. Y. Supp. 605, 611 (1st Dep't 1933).
But, in many cases, the bona fide purchaser for value is protected by application of an
estoppel against an owner who indorses a certificate in blank. National Safe Deposit Co.
v. Hibbs, 229 U. S. 391 (1913). See Steffen, A Proposed Uniform Act Mahng Invcst-
ment Instriunents Negotiable (1934) 34 COL L. RE%. 632; Comment (1935) 39 DIcK. L.
REv. 124; Legis. (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 894.
28. 6 U. L. A. §§ 5-6; Connolly v. Peoples State Bank, 260 'Mich. 352, 244 N. I.
500 (1932).
29. But see Comment (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 653.
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in registration."0 Moreover, fiduciary transfers are specifically exempted
from its provisions. 31 The only significant change wrought by the Act is that
the basis for any remedy in conversion for unauthorized transfers appar-
ently rests not upon the transfer of the share on the corporate books, but
upon the issuance of a new certificate which, by failing to disclose the bene-
ficial interest, enables a subsequent purchaser for value to take without
notice.32 As will be indicated later, this may have an indirect bearing upon
the problem of the choice of laws.
The effect of the conunon law rule has been to vest in the corporation a
judicial function of supervision and adjudication over fiduciaries.3a But
the liability exacted for failure to conform to the required standard of care
has not been counterbalanced by a commensurate benefit. Although a cer-
tain ease in financing is achieved by free transferability of stock certificates,
only in a i-emote sense is a corporation interested in specific changes in the
constituency of its owners. Nor can liability be shifted, as a practical mat-
ter, either to the transfer agent or to the fiduciary.3
4
In view, however, of the developing need for prompt action in fluctuating
security markets, the principal criticism of the drastic common law rule has
arisen not so much from concern over the effects of corporate liability as
from a desire to facilitate administration of trust estates, by easing the
stringent duty of corporations to investigate before registering transfers by
30. Mylander v. Page, 162 Md. 255, 159 Atl. 770 (1932); see Johnson v. Wood, 15
N. J. Misc. 150, 155, 189 Atl. 613, 616 (Cir. Ct. 1936); Turnbull v. Longacre Bank,
249 N. Y. 159, 164, 163 N. E. 135, 137 (1928). A primary effect of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act has been to prefer a bona fide purchaser for value of certificates over a
subsequent attaching creditor of the transferor, where no registration of the transfer had
been effected. Bay City Bank v. Motor Sales Co., 255 Mich. 261, 238 N. W. 241 (1931),
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 918.
31. 6 U. L. A. §2.
32. Pure Oil Co. v. Hunt, 46 Ohio App. 329, 188 N. E. 738 (1933).
33. This effect was early recognized by the English decision first suggesting modifi-
cation of corporate liability [Hartga v. The Bank of England, 3 Ves. 55 (1796)1; and
by the only American decision flatly repudiating the doctrine of corporate liability
[Bank of Virginia v. Craig, 6 Leigh 399 (Va. 1835)]. See Clark, Transfers of Stock
by Fiduciaries (1929) 1 Copp. PRAc. REv. No. 10, p. 66; Scott, Participation in a Breach
of Trust (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 454; Comment (1938) 86 U. or PA. L. REv. 653. But
see Grinnell, Transfers of Stock of Illinois Corporations Held in Trust (1922) 16 ILL.
L. REv. 523.
34. In one case, the corporation has been denied recovery over against the trans-
feree requesting registration. Kempner v. Wallis, 2 Tex. A. Civ. Cas. 516 (Ct. App.
1885). It is debatable whether a like refusal to allow contribution would govern an action
by the corporation for recovery over against the defrauding fiduciary. Any theoretical
recovery over by the corporation against the transfer agent is made unlikely by business
consideration precluding effective relief. Nor can the cestui go against the transfer
agent directly. It is said that the transfer agent acts for the corporation and not the
parties to the transfer. Palmer v. O'Bannon Corp., 253 Mass. 8, 149 N. E. 112 (1925);
Dunham v. City Trust Co., 115 App. Div. 584, 101 N. Y. Supp. 87 (2d Dep't 1906),
aff'd, 193 N. Y. 642, 86 N. E. 1123 (1908).
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fiduciaries with legal title.35 An unfortunate consequence of the delay while
the transfer agent investigates has been a growth of the practice by fiduciaries
of holding stock subject to substantial market fluctuation in the name of a
nominee, thus keeping undisclosed the existence of equitable interests.30
Where legal authority is present, this practice not only relieves the corpora-
tion from all liability to the cestui,37 but also prevents the cestui from fol-
lowing the trust property into the hands of a purchaser for value,3s pro-
vided neither corporation nor purchaser has had actual notice that the re-
quested transfer constitutes a breach of trust.
The burden on corporations and trust estates, together with the anomalous
imposition of a judicial function on the corporation, have prompted statutes
reducing corporate liability for registering transfers in breach of trust. Eng-
land forbids registration on the corporate books in such a form as to indi-
cate fiduciary ownership, and consequently liability is limited to cases of
actual knowledge of the breach of trust.3 In the United States, however,
a transferee, acting in a fiduciary capacity with respect to stock, may still
require a corporation to enter a limited registration. 40 Here, statutes attack
not the form of registration but the degree and legal effect of the notice
which registration imputes to the corporation. The Pennsylvania statute
was the first to require actual votice, notwithstanding that the registration
was in fiduciary form. 41 In the absence of such actual notice, this Act was
35. 9 U. L. A. 147-148, Uniform Fiduciaries Act, § 1 (Comm'rs Notes); H.;D-
BOOK, NATIO.NAL CONFERENCE OF Co2mIssioxaNs ox UNIFORm STAi LAWS A.-:D PLO-
cEEDINGS OF THE THRmr-sEcoxD Axx.:U.L MEETIxG, August 2-8, 1922; LAWv REvsio:
Co.-mnssiox, Legis. Doc. No. 65 () pp. 13, 35 (N. Y. 1937).
36. LAW REvisioN CoyMIssIoN, Legis. Doc. No. 65 (I) p. 7 (N. Y. 1937). It is
suggested that the trustee retain the trust portfolio in limited rather than nominee
registration using a device similar to a short sale to secure current market prices despite
a delay in recordation. See (1938) 48 YAI.E L. J. 106. The odium directed at nominees
controlled by individual fiduciaries might be avoided as to securities listed on any one
exchange by the creation of an independent nominee association holding in its name all
trust inventories.
37. Undisclosed interests pass with legal title to a purchaser for value without
notice. Connolly v. Peoples State Bank, 260 Mich. 352, 244 N. W. 500 (1932). Hence,
the corporation's act of registration does not constitute the proximate cause of loss to
the cestui. See Geyser-Marion Gold-Mining Co. v. Stark, 106 Fed. 558, 565 (C. C. A.
8th, 1901) ; STEVENS, Co RoaATIOxs (1936) § 131.
38. See note 28, supra; Kenneson, Purchase for Falue Without Notice (1914) 23
YALE L. J. 193.
39. Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. V, c. 23, § 101 (originally enactcd, in sub-
stance, as Companies Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 20) ; In re Perldns, 24 Q. B. D. 613
(1890); Grundy v. Briggs [1910] 1 Ch. 444. -As to transfers by personal representa-
tives, see Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. V, c. 23, § 64.
40. The fact that the transferee is a fiduciary and requests a limited registration
does not come ithin the reasonable restrictions on transfer defined by cases in notes
13 and 14, supra.
41. PA. STxT. Axx. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 3151 (originally enacted as 1874
P. L. 222, § 1). Pennsylvania has also enacted the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, PA. STAT.
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construed as making it mandatory for a corporation to register fiduciary
transfers upon request, but without liability.42 Cestuis were restricted to their
traditional remedies against the fiduciary and his sureties.43
The vast majority of American exemption statutes, modeled after Sec-
tion three of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act,44 have adopted actual knowl-
edge4 t as the test of corporate liability. A corporation is also held responsi-
ble where it has knowledge of such facts "that the action in registering the
transfer amounts to bad faith."'40  The Uniform Fiduciaries Act does not,
however, change the common law rules governing corporate liability where
corporate shares standing in the name of a decedent, minor, ward or incom-
petent are presented for transfer on the indorsement or assignment of a
fiduciary representative.47 Only the New York Act applies the same stan-
dard of corporate liability to these situations.48 In one further respect is the
New York Act unique. A corporation could derive little benefit from the
provision of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act defining good faith as "in fact done
honestly, whether it be done negligently or not," 40 as long as either the cor-
poration or its transfer agent had examined documents with reference to a
trust, to determine the fiduciary's general legal authority to act as trustee.
50
In many cases, copies of these documents remained on file. The New York
Act relieves -the corporation of this burden by adopting,5 ' in effect, the Eng-
lish rule52 that an examination of trust documents for the purpose of deter-
mining general legal authority of the fiduciary shall not be deemed examina-
tion for the very different purpose of ascertaining his power to make a par-
ticular transfer.
ANr. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, §§ 3311-3414 (originally enacted as PA. LAWS 1923, 256).
But the former Act was not repealed.
42. Phelps v. The City of Philadelphia, 12 Phila. 300 (Pa. 1878); Stockton v. The
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 14 Phila. 77 (Pa. 1880); Miller v. Westmoreland Coal
Company, 22 Pa. Dist. Rep. 904 (1913).
43. See note 42, supra.
44. 9 U. L. A. 149, Uniform Fiduciaries Act, § 3 (approved by National Confer-
ence of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws in 1922).
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. LAW REVisOrN CommissIoN' Legis. Doc. No. 65 (I) P. 37 (N. Y. 1937). The im-
plicit reason for this limitation was a desire to retain corporate responsibility for inheri-
tance tax payments on transfer of securities from decedents' estates. See CHRISTY, THE
TRANSFER OF STOCK (1929) § 225.
48. N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW, Art. 23-B, § 359-k.
49. 9 U. L. A. 147, Uniform Fiduciaries Act, § 1 (2).
50. For an indication of the technical requirements imposed by transfer officers or
agents of corporations to guard against liability for transfers without authority or in
breach of trust, see RULES OF THE NEW YORK STOCK TRANSFER ASSOCIATION, RUEuS Fi-l
DELIVERY OF SECURITIES OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE AND NimW YORK CURn
MARKET, collected in CHRISTY, TRANSFER OF STOCK (1929) app. B and D, and in LAW
REVIsiON CozmiSsION, Legis. Doe. No. 65 (I) app. A (N. Y. 1937).
51. N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAw, Art. 23-B, § 359-1.
52. Simpson v. Molsons' Bank [1895] A. C. 270; Grundy v. Briggs [1910] 1 Ch. 444,
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In marked contrast to the previous plethora of cases,5 3 in only one in-
stance5 4 since the enactment of these exemption statutes has there been an
attempt by a holder of equitable interests to recover for an unauthorized
transfer. It may be inferred from this situation either that the legislationl5
has had a deterrent effect on litigation of this nature, through discouraging
cestuis from actions to enforce corporate liability, or that both fiduciaries
and corporations in those jurisdictions are adapting their actions to the new
standards.
II
Although ultimate liability rests on the corporation, as a practical matter
the New York banks, as transfer agents, undertake the responsibility of pro-
tecting their corporation principals. The common law rule of liability is
rigorous and well-established, and the exemption statutes do not so readily
insulate the innocent corporation. The New York statute, in particular, might
at first seem to be an effective bulwark, for aside from a few large corpora-
tions which do their own work, New York banks handle the vast majority
of the nation's transfers. But a defrauded cestui is not likely to fly in the
face of this statute by bringing his action against the corporation in New
York. Rather, he will institute suit in one of the many states which have
no exemption law. It will then become the task of the defense to prove that
the New York exemption statute applies in the foreign jurisdiction. The
cestui will in turn insist upon application of either the law of the situs of
the trust, or the law of the corporation's domicile, or the law of the place of
transferring the certificates. Unless each of these places has its own exemp-
tion statute, or unless the New York law is held to be controlling, little bene-
fit can be expected from the New York enactment.
The balance of this Comment will examine possible arguments for and
against the proposition that the foreign suit should be controlled by the law
of New York. Litigation against corporations has not been resorted to by
defrauded cestuis on any extensive scale, but the conflict of laws problems
that would arise in possible future lawsuits are of great present interest to
the transfer agents. The act of registration is a standardized week-long
process. The transfer agents would be very likely to relax their scrutiny and
speed up the registration procedure if the New York exemption law were
sure to apply. But if, for instance, the law of corporate domicile were
deemed controlling, a transfer agent representing corporations scattered
throughout the country could hardly adopt a different procedure for each
corporation. In that event, the present cumbersome methods of registration
would probably persist.
Whether in any case the corporation may rely upon an exemption statute
will depend on the principles of law governing registration, for registration
53. See notes 8 and 9, trpra.
54. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 54 Ohio App. 369, 7 N. E. (2d) 805 (1935).
55. See note 3, sitpra.
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is the basis of corporate liability.56 In view of the numerous operative fac-
tors in accomplishing a transfer of stock, and the varying rules of liability
in different jurisdictions, the choice of laws problem can become exceedingly
complex. An average stock transfer, involving shares of a large corporation,
will embrace a place of corporate domicile, another place where the fiduciary
transfers the certificate at the situs of his trust, and a third place where the
corporation registers the transfer.5 7 Future attempts to enforce corporate
liability will often have to reckon with the variance in these operative fac-
tors in arriving at a choice of controlling law. Analysis of the basis of cor-
porate liability indicates certain probable arguments which might be made
to induce or to justify a choice among the several possibilities. These may
include the rules of law prevailing at (1) the corporate domicile, (2) the
place of transferring the stock certificate, (3) the place at which the new
certificate is issued, and (4) the situs of the trust estate.
Membership in a corporation through stock ownership is usually deemed
a status relationY8 Regardless of where the stockholder resides, keeps his
certificate, or initiates his action against the corporation, the incidents of
this relation-e.g., validity of stock issue,19 voting privilege, 0 dividend pay-
ments,61 and liability for assessments 2 -are governed exclusively by the law
of the corporate domicile. In fact, courts of states other than the state of
incorporation are reluctant to take jurisdiction of controversies involving
these matters of internal management. 3 It would appear to be but a slight
extension to regard registration of fiduciary stock transfers as being in this
category and, therefore, likewise governed by the law of the state of incor-
poration.4 Support for this position springs from the traditional location
56. See note 8, supra.
57. Added difficulties would be introduced by a transfer by the fiduciary of stock
certificates in a jurisdiction other than that in which his trust is situated, or by a statu-
tory requirement for local recordation on duplicate stock books of transfer by foreign
corporations. On the latter point, see N. Y. STOCK CoRP. LAw, art. 11, § 113 (L. 1937,
c. 639).
58. See Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544, 551 (1924); RrSTATE rNT,
TRUSTS (1934) § 183.
59. Axford v. Western Syndicate Inv. Co., 141 Minn. 412, 170 N. W. 587 (1919).
60. Bouree v. Trust Francais, 14 Del. Ch. 332, 127 Att. 56 (1924); see note 24,
supra.
61. United Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 12 F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A.
2d, 1926) ; see note 25, supra.
62. Horton v. Sherrill-Russell Lumber Co., 147 Ky. 226, 143 S. W. 1053 (1912);
Merrimac Mining Co. v. Levy, 54 Pa. 227 (1867) ; RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1934) § 185;
see note 26, supra.
63. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1934) § 192. But this reluctance has not existed in
controversies over transfers of stock of foreign corporations. London, Paris & Amer-
ican Bank, Ltd. v. Aronstein, 117 Fed. 601 (C. C. A. 9th, 1902); Guilford v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 59 Minn. 332, 61 N. W. 324 (1894) ; Westminster Bank v. Elec-
trical Works, 73 N. H. 465, 62 At. 971 (1906); Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co., 215
N. Y. 259, 109' N. E. 250 (1915).
64. See note 58, supra.
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of the situs of corporate stock at the corporate domicile.0 5 In actions con-
cerning stock brought against non-resident certificate holders, 0 a quasi in
rem jurisdiction has been founded in the state of incorporation. In addition,
ancillary administration may be granted at the state of incorporation over
shares belonging to the estate of a non-resident decedent.6 The othervise
plenary powers of the domiciliary administration to act on both the certificate,
when reduced to possession, and the underlying share,cs are thereby removed.
Present procedure for attachment of corporate stock may create objec-
tions to applying the law of corporate domicile. Whereas formerly, by the
majority view, attachment was allowed only at the corporate domicile and
against the share alone,6 9 under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, attach-
ment must occur wherever the certificate can actually be seized or its trans-
fer enjoined. 70 With respect to transfers of stock, the Supreme Court has
declared in the Disconto case'1 that where there has been a merger of share
65. Drug, Inc. v. Hunt, 35 Del. 339, 168 At. 87 (1933). DEL. REv. Comn (1935),
c. 65, § 73 specifies that for all purposes, other than taxation, the situs of stock of domes-
tic corporations shall be regarded as in Delaware. 12 FLErcamn, Cor, nx.o.s (Penn.
ed. 1932) § 5473; RESTATEmExr, CONFLICr OF LAws (1934) § 182; Pomerance, Titc
"Situs" of Stock (1931) 17 CORN. L. Q. 43; Comment (1926) 39 Hnv. L. REv. 4S5.
66. Jellnick v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1 (1S99); Harvey v. Harvey,
290 Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923); McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 13 F. Supp.
53 (D. Aid. 1935); Maerten v. Scott, 33 R. I. 356, 80 At. 369 (1911), (1911) 25 I-LHR%.
L. REv. 74; see 1 BALE, CoNFucT oF LAws (1935) § 104.1.
67. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917); Ewing v. Warren, 144
liss. 233, 109 So. 601 (1926), (1927) 4G H.n v. L. REv. 495, (1927) 25 Mxca. L. Rv.
447; Howard v. Marlin-Rockwell Corp., 156 Misc. 358, 281 N. Y. Supp. 666 (Sup. Ct.
1935); see Goodrich, Problems of ForcLqn Admintistralion (1926) 39 HAnv. L. REV%.
797. But see Norrie v. Kansas City So. Ry., 7 F. (2d) 158, 159 (S. D. N. Y. 1925),(1926) 24 ficii. L. REv. 411; Norrie v. Lohman, 16 F. (2d) 355, 35S (C. C. A. 2d,
1926), (1927) 26 Mici,. L. Ray. 101; Lockwood v. United States Steel Corp., 209
N. Y. 375, 384, 103 N. E. 697, 700 (1913). As a matter of practice, the state of incor-
poration exercises this power sparingly. Griswold v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 94 X. J.
Eq. 308, 120 At1. 324 (1916).
68. Brown v. San Francisco Gas Light Co., 58 Cal. 426 (1831); Luce v. Manches-
ter & Lawrence R. L, 63 N. H. 588, 3 Atl. 618 (1885).
69. Gundry v. Reakirt, 173 Fed. 167 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1909); Wait v. Kern River
Mining, etc., Co., 157 Cal. 16, 106 Pac. 98 (1909); Cord v. Newlin, 71 N. J. Law 438,
59 Ad. 22 (1904); Moys v. Union Trust Co., 276 Pa. 58, 119 Ad. 738 (1923). Some
states allowed an attachment of the certificate. Old Second Nat. Bank Y. Williams,
112 Mich. 564, 71 N. W. 150 (1897) ; Puget Sound Nat. Bank v. Mather, 60 Minn. 362,
62 N. W. 396 (1895); Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., 165 N. Y. 193, 58 N. E.
896 (1900); Cotnareanu v. Woods, 155 Misc. 95, 278 N. Y. Supp. 589 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
70. 6 U. L. A. 17, U.NFoa.m STOcn T,.txsFFR ACT § 13. This statute has been
construed as mandatory on the method of attachment. Johnson v. Wood, 15 N. J. Misc.
150, 189 Atl. 613 (Cir. Ct. 1936); American Surety Co. of N. Y. Y. Kasco Mills, Inc.,
262 N. Y. 585, 188 N. E. 75 (1933). But see Warren v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 116 X. J.
Eq. 315, 328, 173 AU. 128, 134 (1934).
71. Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 267 U. S. 22 (1925) ; Com-
ment (1925) 9 Mixx. L. Rrv. 661. Accord: Pilger v. United States Steel Corp., 102
N. J. Eq. 506, 141 Atl. 737 (1928).
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and certificate, title to the share is governed by the law of the state where
the transfer of the stock certificate took place. Even if no merger has oc-
curred, certificates have been held to be property sui generis, independent
of the state of incorporation, and the law of the state of transfer controls
the validity of the title obtained. 2 But these shifts in situs result only from
a voluntary relinquishment of control by the corporate domicile.73 Thus,
the state of incorporation can annul a transfer of certificates sanctioned by
another state through a refusal to recognize this transfer as passing legal
title to the shares represented.7 4 The transferee of the certificate cannot
compel registration of the transfer unless there has been compliance with
the law prevailing at the corporate domicileJr The law of the state where
the transfer of the certificate takes place may therefore be eliminated, since
the important element of residual control remains in the corporate domicile.
This control embraces the power to enact or to withhold legislation merging
share and certificate. Even when such a merger has been accomplished, the
authority of the state of transfer is limited to control over the legal relations
of the immediate parties to the transfer, and stops short of affecting the lia-
bility of the corporation.70 Moreover, corporate liability does not arise from
a mere tortious transfer of the old certificate; at that stage, the cestui can
72. Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 267 U. S. 22 (1925); Mcr-
ritt v. American Steel-Barge Co., 79 Fed. 228 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897); Kerr v. Urle, 86
Md. 72, 37 Atl. 789 (1897). This is the rule in England. Williams v. Colonial Bank,
38 Ch. D. 388 (1888), aff'd, 15 App. Cas. 267 (1890).
73. Pomerance, The "Sitia" of Stock (1931) 17 CoRN. L. Q. 43; Comments (1936)
14 Cai-KENT Rav. 160, (1926) 39 Hagv. L. Ry. 485, (1937) 85 U. oF PA. L. Rrv. 522.
Only in the field of taxation has the state of incorporation been forcibly deprived of
control over domestic corporations. The former Supreme Court rule allowed taxation of
shares by the corporate domicile on the basis of situs. Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. 1
(1914) ; DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376 (1919) (income tax); Frick v. Pennsyl-
vania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925) (estate tax). This rule in so far as justifying the imposi-
tion of estate tax by the corporate domicile was clearly changed by First National Bank
v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932), limiting this taxing power to the domicile of the de-
cedent. Although a state has not been allowed to impose an estate tax merely on fact
that a foreign corporation does business therein [Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Doughton,
270 U. S. 69 (1926)], a recent Supreme Court decision sanctions a property tax on
shares of a foreign corporation having a commercial domicile in the taxing state. First
Bank Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234 (1937), (1937) 22 MxNN. L. Rav. 121. The
state constituting the locus of transfer of certificate has consistently been allowed a
stamp tax on such transfers. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152 (1907).
74. Drug, Inc. v. Hunt, 35 Del. 389, 168 Atl. 87 (1933). See Cunsrv, Tun Tnsmnmit
oF STOcK (1929) § 66; 12 FLErcHm, CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1932) § 5473; GonCH,
CoNFrLicr OF LAWS (1927) § 155; RESTATEMENT, CoNFLicT OF LAWS (1934) § 53(3);
Comments (1937) 25 GEo. L. J. 729, (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 653; see note 73, .supra.
75. Masury v. Arkansas Nat. Bank, 87 Fed. 381 (C. C. Ark. 1898). But see West-
minster Bank v. Electrical Works, 73 N. H. 465, 480, 62 AtI. 971, 976 (1906).
76. 6 U. L. A. 1-28, UFoptX STocx TRANSFm AcT §§ 1-26; Bay City Bank v.
Motor Sales Co., 255 Mich. 261, 238 N. V. 241 (1931), (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 918; Pure
Oil Co. v. Hunt, 46 Ohio App. 329, 188 N. E. 738 (1933).
19381 FIDUCIARY TRANSFERS OF STOCK
recover the certificate as trust property or can enjoin its further transfer.--
To furnish the element of proximate cause necessary to raise a liability in the
corporation7" there must be a registration on the books of a transfer of the
share or, where share and certificate have been merged, the issuance of a
"clean" certificate. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act'0 implicitly recognizes
this by refraining, with one irrelevant exception,80 from commenting on
corporate liability:
The applicability of the law of corporate domicile cannot be as readily
dismissed. In addition to the factor of residual control, another persuasive
argument may be framed on the concept, originated by the Lowry decision,
that a direct -trust relation exists between the corporation and the ultimate
cestui. If the rule of this case is regarded as applying to a trust in the shares
and not in the stock books-which might have a physical situs in a different
jurisdiction-the law of the state of incorporation would seem to be the
proper source for the definition of corporate obligations to cestuis8s A trust
of this nature would put a corporation in direct default.3 2 But this theory
ignores the basis of corporate liability in more recent decisions, namely, par-
ticipation in the prior breach of the underlying trust by the fiduciary request-
ing transfer.83 According to this analysis, as well as the concept of residual
control, the presence or absence of an exemption statute in the state of in-
corporation s  might well be regarded as an expression of paramount lawin actions brought anywhere against the corporation. But such a conclusion,
77. Geyser-larion Gold Mining Co. v. Stark, 106 Fed. 558, at 561 (C. C A. 8th,
1901).
78. The transferee of the old certificate receives no greater rights by receiving a
new certificate. Geyser-Marion Gold Mining Co. v. Stark, 106 Fed. 558 (C. C. A. 8th,
1901); Citizens' St. Ry. v. Robbins, 128 Ind. 449, 26 N. F. 116 (1891). See Cuusry,
THE Ta. SFnsR OF STOCK (1929) §256; LAW REVISIo Com.issi., LE.is. Doc. No.
65 (I) P. 15 (N.Y. 1937).
79. 6 U. L. A. 1-28, Uniform Stock Transfer Act §§ 1-26.
80. 6 U. L. A. 22, Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 17.
81. Mercer v. Buchanan, 132 Fed. 501 (C. C. D. Pa. 1904), rcv'd on other grounds,
137 Fed. 1019 (C. C. A. 3d, 1905); Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Watrous, 109
Conn. 268, 146 Ati. 727 (1929); Bouree v. Trust Francais, 14 Del. Ch. 332, 127 AUt.
56 (1924); Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N. E. 461 (1920); Cutts V.
Najdrowski, 121 N. J. Eq. 546, 191 Atl. 867 (1937).
82. See cases cited supra note 81.
83. See notes 8 and 9, supra.
84. The forum sometimes indulges in a rebuttable presumption that the domicile
of a foreign corporation has similar statutory provisions, such as Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, on the theory that such provisions are but codifications of common law.
principles. Patterson v. Fitzpatrick McElroy Co., 247 IlL App. 81 (1927); Turnbull
v. Longacre Bank, 249 N. Y. 159, 163 N. E. 135 (192-8). Without such a presumption.
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act by its own provisions can have no extraterritorial
application where not enacted at the domicile of the foreign corporation. 6 U. L A. 25,
UNiFom STocK TR.ANSFr Act § 22(1); Drug, Inc. v. Hunt, 35 Del. 3S9, 168 AU. 87
(1933) ; Barstow v. City Trust Co., 216 Mass. 330, 103 N. E- 911 (1914) ; U. S. Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. Newburger, 263 N. Y. 16, 188 N. E. 141 (1933).
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if uniformly applied, would dissipate much of the force intended for ex-
emption legislations5 by limiting its application to actions against domestic
corporations, rather than to any action based on a local transfer.
Corporate liability is now generally regarded as dependent upon the es-
tablishment of a prior breach of trust by the fiduciary.80 The law applicable
to the latter question-the law of the situs of the trust-may be advanced
as a basis for the choice of law governing corporate liability. A breach ren-
dering the fiduciary liable must certainly be established as a condition prece-
dent to liability of the corporation.8 7 In the absence of such a breach, the
corporation is not only privileged, but can be compelled, to execute a trans-
fer requested by the fiduciary.88 Once breach has been established, the
illegality of the corporation's participation seemingly rests upon its inde-
pendent act of registration. In many instances, a physical concurrence of
corporate domicile and place of registration is prevented by the corporate
practice of acting through a transfer office or agent or of keeping stock and
stock certificate books in a jurisdiction other than that of incorporation. Since
the imposition of liability on the corporation is based on the idea that regis-
tration is a participation by the corporation in the fiduciary's prior breach of
trust,8 9 the determination of whether this participation is tortious would, by
the majority view, depend on the lex loci delicti90 -the state of registration.
The law of the corporate domicile has never supplied either the definition
of, or the remedy for, a corporation's torts consummated in a foreign juris-
diction.91
However, the composite nature of the act of registration itself may con-
ceivably prevent all its component factors from occurring in the same state.'
When such is the case, the convenience and desirability of subdividing the
act of registration becomes apparent. Logically, the controlling law should
be that of the locus of the most important factor or combination of fac-
tors. 93 In registering a fiduciary transfer, the essential step is the issuance
85. See notes 3 and 5, supra.
86. See notes 8 and 9, supra.
87. See notes 8 and 9, supra. In some instances, different laws will govern matters
of validity, construction, interpretation and administration. The trustee's powers and
liabilities will generally be determined by an examination of the law at the situ' of
trust administration. Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N. E. 461 (1920);
Swetland v. Swetland, 105 N. J. Eq. 608, 149 Atl. 50 (1930), aff'd, 107 N. 5. Eq. 504,
153 Atl. 907 (1931). See CHRsrY, THE TRANsFm OF STOCK (1929) § 66; RrsTAT1r-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 297-299.
88. See notes 13 and 14, supra.
89. See notes 8 and 9, supra.
90. N. Y. Cent. R. R. v. Chisholm, 268 U. S. 29 (1925); Dawson v. Dawson, 224
Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931); Hoxie v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 82 Conn. 352,
73 Atl. 754 (1909); Lemieux v. Boston & M. R. R., 219 Mass. 399, 106 N. E. 992
(1914); Whitford v. The Panama R. R., 23 N. Y. 465 (1861).
91. See RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 166.
92. See note 6, supra.
93. See note 91, supra.
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of a new certificate which, by failing to disclose equitable interests, enables
a subsequent purchaser for value to take without notice and deprives the
cestui of an opportunity to follow the trust propertyP Furthermore, the
choice of law will be simplified by the fact that, although a transfer of the
shares may be made on numerous stock books, only one cancellation of the
old, and issuance of the new, certificate can occur.
When a corporation executes a fiduciary stock transfer in a jurisdiction
other than that of its domicile, the place of transfer should supply the stan-
dard of reasonable care, and should outline conditions under which the
corporation may act. This conclusion does not require the divorce of residual
control from the domicile, but is founded rather on the tort liability of cor-
porations acting in other states. The transfer of stock has never been ac-
corded status as a matter of internal management. Nor has the trust theory
in the Lowry case been accorded subsequent recognition. The maintenance
of a transfer office or agent satisfies jurisdictional requirements.03 Pressure
for exemption legislation has arisen primarily from the prevalence of the
practice by fiduciaries of holding corporate stock in the name of nominees
to avoid the delay attendant on the satisfaction by the corporation of its re-
sponsibility to avoid possible imposition of liability on motion of a defrauded
cestuiY9 The same trend of requiring cestuis to rely on recourse against the
fiduciary and his sureties can be discerned in the relaxation of the responsi-
bilities of purchasers of trust property.Yr Delay in transfer will not be sub-
stantially mitigated if exemption legislation is limited in its application to
domestic corporations, for the exemption laws have been passed not in those
states specializing in attractive incorporation provisions, but rather in juris-
dictions, such as New York, where large financial centers handle a huge
volume of stock transfers. 5
94. Geyser-Marion Gold Mining Co. v. Stark, 106 Fed. 558 (C. C.A. 8th, 1901).
95. See, for example, N. Y. STocn Co"n. LAWv § 113.
96. See LAw REvisiox Commssiov, LELs. Doc. 65(I) pp. 7-32 (N.Y. 1937). A
recent holding by Surrogate Delehanty in Matter of Harris, (Surr. C) N. Y. Law
journal, May 25, 1938, (1938) 48 YAtz L. J. 106 construes N. Y. SunrIaWoc CoUR
Act § 231 to forbid the use of nominees. This decision similarly bans fiduciary holding
of bearer bonds. Prior to this ruling, the unexercised possibility for the use of 'bearer
shares. as an alternative to nominee registration, remained open. Legislation [see
N. Y. PE.s. PRoP. LAW, art. 6-A, § 186-186c (L. 1927, c. 387, § 1)] authorizing the
issuance of such shares would control only domestic corporations.
97. See Scott, Participation it; Breach of Trust (1931) 34 HArnv. L REv. 454, 464.
98. Thus, New York affords liberal exemption to corporations registering fiduciary
transfers (see note 3, supra), while Delaware requires a court order authorizing the
fiduciary to make the particular transfer. DEL. REv. Corm (1935) c. 98, § 61.
The intention of the sponsors of the New York Act to cover all local registrations
is stated in their recommendations and supported by the Act's inclusion in the General
Business Law rather than in the Stock Corporation Law. See LAw Rxvrsxoi Con-
mzssiox, LEGis. Doc. 65(I) p. 45 (N.Y. 1937).
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